subtle and close, but the two elements can be easily separated. It avails nothing to say that until the thought is placed under a concept, it is not a thought. This is a mere question of definition, not of actual fact.

I would point out one other consideration. If Prof. Müller's theory were true for all kinds of thinking, development would be impossible. If man could not think without language, and could not have language without thinking, he would never have had either, except by a miracle. And scientific men will not accept the alternative. We can conceive shadowy thoughts gradually shaping to themselves a language for expression, and we can understand how each would improve the other, until by constant interaction, a higher process of thought was introduced. But we cannot conceive the sudden appearance of the faculty of abstraction together with its ready-made signs or words.

I have often wished that Prof. Müller would state distinctly how his theory accounts for the very first beginnings of language. I have not been able to discover any explanation of this point in his "Lectures on the Science of Language."

Clapham, June 6. ARTHUR EBBELS.

As poets have extraordinary inklings and *aperçus* on the most abstruse scientific questions, Wordsworth's opinion on this matter (quoted by De Quincy) is worth considering: Language is not the "*dress*" of thought, it is the "*incarnation.*" This is Shelley's *aperçu* of Darwinism. Man exists "but in the future and the past; being, not what he is, but what he has been and shall be."

How to "distil working ideas from the obscurest poems"—to use Lord Acton's words—is one of the secrets of genius.

A. GRENFELL.

THE interesting discussion between Mr. Francis Galton and Prof. Max Müller on this subject will doubtless raise many questions in the minds of those who have paid some attention to the habits of animals. I have been asking myself whether, if Prof. Max Müller is right in his conclusion—"Of course we all admit that without a name we cannot really know anything" (an *utterable* name, I presume), and "one fact remains, animals have no language"—animals must not, therefore, be held by him incapable of knowing anything. This would bring us to the question whether animals *know* in the same manner as men, or in some other manner which men do not understand. Now, I think—at least it is as strong a conviction as I am capable of entertaining—that animals not only know, but deal with the materials of knowledge—facts—in a manner quite indistinguishable from the manner in which I mentally handle them myself. Thus, I place an animal in circumstances which are quite unfamiliar to it, and from which it is urgently pressed to escape. There are two, or perhaps three, courses open to it; one being, to my mind, patently the most advantageous. It tries all of them, and selects that which I should have chosen myself, though it is much longer in coming to its conclusion. Here the animal has the same facts as the man to deal with, and, after consideration and examination, its judgment precisely corresponds with the man's. I cannot, then, find it possible to deny that the mental operations are identical in *kind*; but that they are not so in *degree* can be demonstrated by my importing into the situation an element foreign to the experience of the animal, when its failure is certain. It makes no difference whether the animal is under stress, or acting voluntarily. It may frequently be found to choose the method which most recommends itself to the man's judgment. Every student of animals is familiar with numbers of such cases. Indeed they are constantly being recorded in the columns of NATURE, and abound in all accepted works on animal intelligence. I am quite prepared to admit that where there are two or more courses open to it the animal will occasionally select that which presents the greatest difficulties, and labour most assiduously to overcome them, sometimes trying the remaining courses and returning to that which it first chose. Darwin gives a good example of the honey-bee ("Origin of Species," p. 225, edition 1872). But no one will be surprised at imperfect judgment or vacillation of will in an animal, when such are common among men.

Prof. Max Müller lays down the very distinct proposition that "animals have no language." I suppose *utterable* language is meant. Is this so? That their sign-language is both extensive and exact (and even understood to some extent as between widely different species) most naturalists, I apprehend, will entertain no doubt. But has any species an utterable language? What is to be the test of this? First there is the whole gamut of vocal expressions—which even we understand—conveying the ideas of pain, pleasure, anger, warning. What sportsman who has stalked extremely shy animals does not know the moment a bird or animal utters a certain note that he is discovered? If Prof. Max Müller will not admit this to be language, I, for one, must ask him what it is. It conveys to others a distinct idea, in general if not in special terms, and seems to me quite equivalent to "Oh, dear!" "This is nice" (expressed, I believe, in some African language by the reduplicated form *ñum-ñum*, the letter *n* having the same value as in the Spanish *mañana*), "Leave off, "Look out," "Come here," &c. Those who have heard animals calling to one another, particularly at night, and have carefully noted the modulations of their voices (why should there be modulations unless they have a definite value), will find it very hard to accept Prof. Max Müller's conclusion that "animals have no language." Every female mammal endowed with any kind of voice has the power of saying "Come here, my child," and it is an interesting fact beyond question that the knowledge of this call is feebly or not at all inherited, but must be impressed upon the young individual by experience. Further, the young brought up by an alien foster-mother pay no attention to the "Come here, my child," of the alien species. The clucking of the hen meets with no response from the ducklings she has reared, even when she paces frantically by the side of the pond imploring them not to commit suicide. But let us creep up under the banks of a sedgy pool at about this time of year. There swims a wild duck surrounded by her brood, dashing here and there at the rising *Phryganidæ*. Now let the frightful face of man peer through the sedges. A sharp "quack" from the duck, and her brood dive like stones, or plunge into the reeds. She, at least, knows what to say to them.

The already inordinate length of this letter precludes me from offering any instances of the communication of *specific* intelligence by means of the vocal organs of animals. I think it probable that we far under-rate the vocabulary of animals from deficient attention—and, I speak for myself, stupidity. Possibly Prof. Max Müller has not yet examined "Sally," the black chimpanzee. If not, he would surely be much interested. She is by no means garrulous, but, in spite of her poor vocal capacity, if he should still consider that she "cannot really know anything" on that account, I must have completely misinterpreted his letter to Mr. Galton. ARTHUR NICOLS.

Watford, June 3.

Two Friends.

THE remarks on the reasoning powers of animals (dogs in particular) given in your issue of June 9 (p. 124) induce me to relate an experience of my own. We possess a dog and a cat, both males, the former called Griffon here, much like a Skye terrier, the latter a splendid animal (a cross of the Angora). These two animals are bound to each other by the closest friendship, which began thus:—The dog came to us two years ago, quite a pup—about three months old. Soon after a small, wretched, half-starved kitten arrived at our door asking hospitality. The dog at once adopted it, let it eat out of the same dish, let it sleep on the same mat (and continues to do so still), in fact took entire charge of it. A black cat, a very vicious creature, and seemingly wild, haunted our garden, to the great destruction of birds' nests and to the excessive terror of the kitten. As the dog grew, it became the kitten's protector against the black cat, and has been so now for two years. If it was indoors and heard a cry of distress from our cat, you could not hold it from flying wildly to its rescue, forcing someone to open the door, or darting through a window. It has done this so long, and with such effect, that the black cat scarcely dares show its face in the garden, as the dog invariably attacks it with fury and drives it away, following it along the road to see if it is quite gone. I do not know if you will think this worthy of insertion, but I think it curious, and I can vouch for its truth. M. C.

La Tour de Peily, June 13.

The Use of Flowers by Birds.

As a curious incident enacted by sparrows has just come under my notice, which possesses some added interest in connexion with the two occurrences recorded by your correspondent

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J. M. H.—viz. the employment by some finches of flowers in the formation of their nests (NATURE, vol. xvi. p. 83, and vol. xxxvi. pp. 101–2)—it may be worth while to submit a detailed consideration of the case.

The front of the house of a friend living at No 47 Highbury Hill is covered by an extensive growth of white jasmine which reaches beyond the first-floor windows. For several years house-sparrows have used the bushy branches of this shrub without causing special attention. This year, however, they have taken a new departure in nest-building. Not satisfied, apparently, with the hay, straw, and other ordinary materials of sparrow architecture, they have suddenly aspired to appropriating to their use the bright yellow flowers of laburnum, two trees of which are in full bloom a few yards from the first-floor window-sills below which they are carrying on their operations. Three nests were discovered twelve days ago, built close together in the jasmine, all of which had laburnum flowers strewn upon the top of ordinary nests; one nest contained two young birds just hatched, and the other two had each a couple of eggs. As they rather disturbed the lady occupant of the house, she had all three nests destroyed, the litter from them entirely filling a large foot-bath. But the three pairs of birds, as might be expected, only set to work rebuilding their nests in the same place, furnishing them with more laburnum than before. They were however again disturbed, and an obstacle (which in a previous year had proved effectual in stopping the building in another part of the house front) was set in the place of the nests, but still they did not desist; two pairs continued to add their materials on the top of it, with more laburnum than ever, replenishing the nest as constantly as it was removed, while the third pair rebuilt their nest under the sill of the next window, using laburnum also. Even entire sprays of the flowers were used, and the ground beneath the trees was so much strewn with fragments that my friend at first thought that boys had been pulling the trees. All the birds are now allowed to remain unmolested, and the yellow decoration is withered, without fresh being provided.

This unaccustomed action of the sparrows is apparently somewhat different from the operations described by your correspondent J. M. H., for the bright golden flowers enveloping the nests are so strangely conspicuous as to attract the attention of passers by, and therefore cannot answer the protective purpose evident both in the case of the goldfinches with forget-me-nots and of the sparrows that used Alyssum. The only explanation I can suggest is that the birds have elevated their æsthetic taste to this "quite too too" extent of art cultus: It is highly interesting to note also that—in opposition to the notions of the obsolete school of naturalists, who believed only in blind instinct—the rage for collecting their favourite "yellow" is infectious with these little yearners for the intense, just as is the desire for "blue" that now and then breaks out (like a disease) amongst larger householders. The three pairs of birds seemed to vie with one another in their revelry of the chosen colour. It will be instructive to learn whether the fashion will last for many seasons: perhaps it will languish of satiety, and some other attraction of a less absorbing kind arise.

The fondness of birds (in this country at least), for the colour yellow is perhaps worth considering in this connexion. A large number of wild or cultivated plants might be enumerated that produce yellow flowers, which are either used as food or have their petals mauled by birds. There need be no doubt, I think, that the mutilation of such flowers is due to a playful fondness rather than to a dislike of the flowers. That birds evidently exercise the selective faculty in the choice of flowers is well illustrated by the fact, twice observed by my brother, that sparrows pull to pieces the yellow flowers only in mixed beds of pansies, and of crocuses, without injuring a single purple, mauve, or white flower of either kind. I have myself also witnessed the same selective operation performed by a sparrow on various crocuses growing in pots upon my window-sill, and I find many correspondents gave similar testimony to this fact in a series of letters which appeared in these pages in the year 1877 (vols. xvi. and xvii.). It may be questioned whether the education of their preference for the colour yellow is in any way connected with the fact that it is proper to the yolk of their eggs, and which they must be aware of; but since all good eggs contain that colour, while probably some birds do not like it and greatly prefer other colours, this suggestion may be no more valid as a theory than would be the argument that some people's taste for claret-colour is due to the analogous physiological accident of arterial coloration. The rich yellow colour, again, of the beaks, entire mouths, and "open sepulchres" of the newly-hatched nestlings affords their parents ample opportunities for the contemplation of colour, and there may be an unconscious mental absorption of the colour in consequence of this course of training. At any rate, canary yellow is very highly developed in many species of the *Fringillidæ*, and there is a strong tendency towards the development of the yellowish colour in the plumage of the males of several British finches, apparently through a greenish-brown tinge. It is also well developed amongst the weavers and the orioles, to which they are so nearly allied. That sparrows should thus use sprays of flowers is perhaps not so remarkable when we recall the close affinity they bear to *Ploceus* and other weaver-birds.

Doubtless the colour-sense in birds, as well as in insects, is a real factor in the evolution of the floral beauty that surrounds them, although the *modus operandi* is not always one that can be so readily traced. WILLIAM WHITE.

55 Highbury Hill, London, June 9.

Names for Electric Units of Self-Induction and Conductivity.

A NAME seems to be wanted for the practical unit of self-induction, viz. an ohm multiplied by a second; in other words, for a length approximately equal to an earth-quadrant. Profs. Ayrton and Perry call it a "secohm." Why not call it a "quad"? It would be a handy great length for many other purposes. For instance, the velocity of light in air would be 30 quads per second, in common glass 20 quads per second.

To avoid misunderstanding, it would have to be understood that the actual earth-quadrant passing through any given place is only approximately a quad, its real value having to be determined geodetically. A quad is to be understood as ten million metres *precisely*.

Another unit requiring a name is the unit of conductivity. Sir William Thomson has suggested the word "mho," but it has not been greedily assimilated. I make the small suggestion of omitting the *h*. True, the expressions 12 mo and 16 mo would at first excite only bookbinding ideas, but they would soon carry a fresh meaning to electricians. OLIVER J. LODGE.

June 13.

Units of Weight, Mass, and Force.

THE necessity for *names* for the units of velocity and acceleration is very clearly illustrated by a criticism of my "Dynamics for Beginners," which appears in the *Practical Engineer* of June 3. After objecting to the introduction of new names, and explaining that *a velo* stands for *a foot per second*, the writer proceeds:—"The second new name is 'celo,' and is meant for an acceleration of *one foot per second*, or unit acceleration; so that if a body is moving with a velocity which is being accelerated *at the rate of one foot per second*, it is said in the new language to possess one celo. In other words, a celo means *an acceleration of one foot per second*, or *of one velo*." The italics are mine. I cannot resist quoting also the following sentence, which occurs a little lower down in the same criticism:—"We think there is something ridiculous about the adoption of these names, which, while possessing the very questionable advantage of shortening the language of the subject by some two or three words, *serve to muddle the mind of the student, and to obscure the sense by wrapping it up in meaningless words.*"

Why is not the *Practical Engineer* consistent? He ought to state that just as a celo is unnecessary, for he considers it the same as a velo, in like manner a velo is unnecessary, for by the same line of argument it must be the same as a *foot*. The fact is that the names velo and celo are not *necessary* for scientific men, although I expect they will be found to be convenient. It is, I believe, generally admitted that some such words are greatly needed by teachers; for it is the clear mental differentiation of the ideas expressed by velo and celo, or the want of it, which often marks the distinction between a sound physicist and a muddler. JOHN B. LOCK.

Gonville and Caius College, June 4.

I AGREE with your correspondent, Mr. R. B. Hayward (NATURE, vol. xxxv. p. 604), in holding that names for the dynamical units are of less importance than a convenient nota-

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